Ayer fue publicado lo que seguramente será un parteaguas en el diseño de la política macroeconómica en el mundo. Se trata del paper "
Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy" de Olivier Blanchard (Chief Economist del Fondo Monetario Internacional), Giovanni Dell'Ariccia y Paolo Mauro. El paper no tiene desperdicio y hace un llamado a replantear muchas de las preconcepciones existentes en materia de política macroeconómica (en temas tanto fiscales como monetarios).
Espero sinceramente que este trabajo sea leído por nuestras autoridades económicas en Hacienda y Banco de México (pasados, presentes y futuros), para que no se repitan los errores que condujeron a que en el 2009 hayamos tenido la tercera caída más importante en el PIB desde que se tiene registro de este indicador.
El resumen de una entrevista con Blanchard sobre este trabajo fue publicada antier por el WSJ:
What was the goal of your exercise?
Blanchard: We were trying to force people to rethink a number of things. I was in a good position to think what had gone wrong and what we could do better. The larger goal is to indicate the International Monetary Fund is able to think too.
You suggest that before the global recession, policy makers had become too complacent and relied too much on a single tool, monetary policy.
Blanchard: Yes. Even monetary policy had become extremely simplified. There was sense all we had to look at the policy interest rate and that was it. We thought we had come to a level of detail. That wasn’t quite right.
The most striking suggestion you make is that nations should consider aiming for a higher rate of inflation,
Blanchard: Before the crisis, if you talked to policy makers, the idea of being stuck at zero interest rate would have struck them as very unlikely. That happened in Japan. But most people convinced themselves that the Japanese didn’t know what they were doing.
Now we realize that if we had a few hundred extra basis points to rely on, that would have helped. We would have had to rely less on fiscal policy. So it would have been good to start with a higher nominal rate. The only way to get there is higher inflation.
Policy makers have generally chosen a 2% (inflation rate target). But there was no very good reason to use 2% rather than 4%. Two percent doesn’t mean price stability. Between 2% and 4%, there isn’t much cost from inflation.
So should we change the inflation target?
Blanchard: If I were to choose inflation target today, I’d strongly argue for 4%. But we have started with 2%, so going from 2% to 4% would raise issues of credibility. We should have a discussion about it.
What’s an inflation level we should fear?
Blanchard: When you get to high numbers – 10% and above– people see uncertainty. They don’t know to know what’s gong to happen. You don’t how to plan from retirement.
Would you need to get an international agreement among central bankers on a higher inflation target?
Blanchard: Going international would increase credibility. It’s probably not needed but it would be helpful.
You also suggest a much bigger role for financial regulation to handle macroeconomic problems.
Blanchard: If there are things going wrong in financial markets, don’t try to use interest rate to kill bubbles. The collateral damage is just too much. Central banks should be in charge of (financial) regulation. The central bank should have these (regulatory) tools at their disposal.
Another area that you say is ripe for change is automatic stabilizers, which are government programs that increase spending or reduce taxes during economic downturns, such as unemployment insurance.
Blanchard: Automatic stabilizers weren’t designed to stabilize the economy. They were designed for other purposes (such as social equity or helping individuals). We should be thinking of automatic stabilizers which are designed to stabilize the economy.
An example is a cyclical investment tax credit. It would come into effect when economic activity slows down. Companies would get it automatically without Congress having to vote on it.
Nota: Agradezco a Gabriel Sod por compartir el documento.